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Abstract
We develop a simple test to assess whether horizontal spillover effects from multinational
to domestic firms are endogenous to the market structure generated by the entry of the same
multinationals. In particular, we analyze the performance of a panel of 10,650 domestic
and multinational firms operating in Romania in the period 1995-2001. Controlling for
the simultaneity bias in productivity estimates through semi-parametric techniques, we find
that changes in domestic firms’ TFP are positively related to the first foreign investment
in a specific industry and region, but get significantly weaker and become negative as the
number of multinationals that enter in the considered industry/region increases. We can
thus recover evidence of changing marginal effects in domestic firms’ TFP, the sign of which
depends on a specific threshold in the presence of foreign firms.
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1 Introduction
The debate on the existence of productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI),
taking place through contacts between multinational (MNE) and domestic firms, is a hot topic
in the economic literature. The outcome of the debate is also very relevant in terms of policies: a
confirming stance is often taken as a justification of expensive incentive packages for the attrac-
tion of foreign investors, while the evidence of negative effects is likely to nurture protectionist
arguments. Nevertheless, empirical studies have not come up with a clear answer to the question
whether domestic firms benefit from foreign investors or not.
Pioneering empirical studies on sector-specific data by Caves (1974), Globerman (1979),
Blomstrom and Persson (1983) and Blomstrom (1986) generally conclude that there are indeed
positive productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms. Aitken and Harrison (1999) criticize
the methodology of the sectoral studies where positive spillovers were found, by arguing that
foreign investments primarily occur in sectors where domestic total factor productivity (TFP) is
already high, thus leading to a critical identification problem. Using panel data on Venezuelan
plants and controlling for fixed differences in productivity levels across industries, they find no
significant intra-industry spillovers from foreign firms on domestic firms. Other studies with firm-
level panel data also failed to identify positive spillovers from FDI, leading Gorg and Greenaway
(2004), in their extensive survey of this literature, to point out the inconclusive evidence emerging
from several empirical contributions on the issue1.
More recently, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), working on Lithuanian firm-specific data, has
detected significant positive spillovers arising through backward linkages, i.e. generated through
contacts between multinational affiliates and local input suppliers (vertical spillovers). She
finds instead no clear evidence in favour of either intra-industry effects (horizontal spillovers),
or forward linkages. Similar results have been obtained by Blalock and Gertler (2004) on a
sample of Indonesian firms. In particular this latter generation of papers, in addition to the
endogeneity problem, successfully addresses a series of other methodological issues not fully
taken into account by the previous literature, namely the selection bias that might arise from the
entry and exit of firms given the unbalanced panel nature of the datasets, and the simultaneity
bias induced by productivity shocks correlated with firm-level input usage.
And yet the finding in the recent literature of positive vertical spillovers and no, or even
negative, horizontal ones poses a puzzle, since, as argued by Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004),
1For example the studies of Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco, of Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on
the Czech Republic, and of Konings (2001) on Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, either fail to find a significant
positive effect or even detect a negative impact that multinational corporations generate on the performance of
domestic firms in the same sector. The situation is slightly different for developed countries, where some studies
have found evidence of positive intra-industry spillovers (e.g., Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2002, using UK plant
level data).
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if multinational firms generate positive externalities to domestic suppliers, the increase in the
quality of inputs they produce should also lead to increases in TFP of downstream domestic
firms.
Under the latter lines of argument, the lack of positive horizontal spillovers is clearly counter-
intuitive. One therefore wonders whether the standard model designs used insofar by the eco-
nomic literature to detect them are appropriate. In general, all the previously quoted studies
measure horizontal spillovers by regressing, within a panel structure, some indicator of produc-
tivity of domestic firms against an indicator of ‘presence’ of MNEs in the same industry2. By
looking at the average sign and significance of this coefficient, inference is then made on the
presence or not of horizontal spillovers and their impact on the performance of domestic firms.
The key issue, however, is that any single ex-post measure of spillovers within a panel
structure is the result of two sources of variation: the sign of the effect of MNEs’ entry across
the observational units, and the change in the sign of these effects over time. In other words,
the marginal impact of MNEs on the performance of domestic firms is not necessarily always
positive or negative over time, due to the changing market structure induced by the entry of new
firms. So, in order to assess whether a domestic firm benefits from foreign entry, the dynamics
generated by the changing number of foreign entrants seem important.
More specifically, we know that the presence of a MNE might entail, through various channels
(technological or pecuniary externalities), a positive horizontal spillover, i.e. a reduction in the
marginal cost of production for domestic firms in the same industry, and thus an increase in
their TFP. At the same time, a negative competition effect induced by the entry of a MNE
can occur. In the product market, the domestic firm’s output could be crowded out by the
foreign competitor. Given a slow adjustment in inputs due to adjustment costs, or a partial
usage of capital, unobserved by the econometrician, total factor productivity might tend to
decrease after the entry of a competitor. In the labor market, foreign firms may attract the
higher-skilled workers at the detriment of domestic firms, since MNEs tend to pay higher wages
(e.g. Aitken et al., 1996), thus providing another channel through which the entry of a foreign
firm may negatively affect domestic TFP. In a cross-sectional regression, these two contrasting
forces will determine the outcome in terms of performance changes of domestic firms, and thus
our assessment on the existence and sign of horizontal spillover.
Nevertheless, to properly evaluate horizontal spillovers in a panel design, we also need to
consider the combined dynamics of these effects, for which we have no priors. If positive horizonal
spillovers are present, and the production frontier of domestic firms is below the frontier of
2In the ‘horizontal’ case, the most commonly used indicator of MNEs’ presence is the share of MNE’s em-
ployment over total employment within the considered industry. Such a practice might be itself subject to some
criticism, as discussed in the next sections.
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foreign firms, we can eventually expect a convergence in total factor productivity of domestic
firms towards the foreign ones as more MNEs enter in the local market yielding decreasing
positive spillovers3. However, the same increasing presence of multinationals might affect the
size of the negative competition effect in different directions: one can expect the negative effects
to grow larger with MNEs’ entry, or it could be the case that the surviving local competitors
adapt their production processes to the changing market conditions, with domestic firms’ TFP
thus increasing as more MNEs enter. As a consequence of these dynamics, the outcome in terms
of performance of domestic firms is not constant, but rather endogenous to the market structure
generated by the progressive entry of new firms. Therefore, an assessment of horizontal spillovers
based on the sign and significance of a single coefficient within a panel regression could lead to
biased and, as it is often the case, insignificant results.
These dynamic effects, which could be at the origin of the previously quoted puzzle, have
not been properly taken into account in the literature4. Thus, the aim of this paper is to test
more precisely the nature of the relation between the changes in the cumulate number of foreign
investments and the changes in productivity of domestic firms. In particular, we develop a
simple framework to test for the existence of a threshold number of foreign investors below
which horizontal spillovers are positive, and above which there is a negative marginal effect
on domestic TFP (or the other way round). If such a threshold exists for a positive number
of MNEs, we can conclude that the concept of ‘marginal’ spillovers becomes relevant, i.e. the
combined effects of positive horizontal spillover and competition on domestic firms’ TFP are not
constant, but rather varying with the progressive entry of new MNEs. The direction of variation
(from positive to negative or the other way round) is then assessed by looking at the signs of
the coefficients.
The prediction of a non-constant marginal effect is tested on a sample of indigenous firms
in Romania during the period 1995-2001 using firm-specific FDI data which start in 1990. As
FDI was virtually prohibited before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the sample allows us
to track MNEs from the very first investment on. Anticipating our results, we find that in
Romania a positive threshold number of MNEs exists around which the impact on domestic firms’
TFP changes from positive to negative, thus highlighting the relevance of marginal spillovers.
Moreover, we also find this threshold to be industry-specific.
These results allow us to partially solve the apparent puzzle surrounding the existence of
3For example, in their studies of UK establishments Griffith et al. (2002) find that increased foreign presence
within an industry is correlated with productivity growth in domestic establishments through an increased speed
of technology transfer, ultimately leading to a convergence of domestic firms’ TFP to the technology frontier.
4The only exception we are aware of is Sabirianova et al. (2005), who interact the indicator of foreign presence
with time dummies in their panel regression in order to retrieve time-varying effects. While they find spillovers
to be significantly different over time, they however do not perform any specific testing on the nature of these
dynamic effects.
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horizontal spillovers. If marginal effects are relevant, i.e. if a positive FDI threshold exists,
then standard model designs testing for horizontal spillovers are not appropriate, since they are
likely to generate biased and/or insignificant results. Standard inference on horizontal spillovers
through the traditional model designs can instead be done once marginal spillovers are proven
to be insignificant. The results also shed new light on policy recommendations for attracting
foreign investors. If marginal spillovers are relevant and, as it is the case for Romania, the
effects on domestic firms are initially positive and then declining as more MNEs enter, then FDI
attraction policies should focus on industries where there is no or little foreign presence, since
in these sectors the positive spillover effect is likely to outweigh the negative competition effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the investment
and TFP data employed in the analysis, while section 3 presents our methodology. Section 4
analyzes the empirical results and performs some robustness checks. Finally, section 5 concludes
with the findings and some future lines of research.
2 The Romanian dataset
Our dataset is composed of domestic firms and affiliates of multinational enterprises operating
during the period 1995-2001 in Romania, as retrieved from AMADEUS. The latter is a compre-
hensive, pan-European database developed by a consulting firm, Bureau van Dijck. It contains
balance sheet data in time series on 7 million public and private companies in 38 European
countries (2004 edition). The dataset comes as a modular product: a version including the top
250,000 companies, the top 1.5 million (employed in this paper) or all 7 million companies in
the considered countries. In the case of Romania, the dataset reports information retrieved by
the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the institution to which all firms have to be
legally registered and report their balance sheet data. In particular, the ‘intermediate’ version
of AMADEUS used in this paper includes data on 30,148 firms for Romania (2004 edition).
For every firm we have sought information on its location within each of the eight Romanian
regions and the industry in which these firms operate (at the NACE-2 and 3 level, as reported
in the Statistical Annex), as well as yearly balance sheet data on tangible and intangible fixed
assets, total assets, number of employees, material costs and revenues (turnover). Moreover, we
have gathered information on the year of incorporation in order to distinguish between firms
which have always been operating in the considered time span and firms which have entered over
the period, thus controlling for a possible sample selection bias resulting from unbalanced panel
data, in line with the previous literature. Exiting firms are also considered, recording as exiters
those firms which do not report any information after a given year. Finally, we have included
in the sample only those firms for which detailed information on the ownership structure is
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available: in particular, we have considered a firm as foreign if more than 10 per cent of its
capital belongs to a MNE, and domestic otherwise.
This has yielded a total of 10,650 employable firms, 30 per cent of which are MNEs in year
2001. The entry and exit dynamics of our sample are reported in Table 1: as it can be seen, the
entry rates of our sample match very closely the official entry rates recorded by the Romanian
Chamber of Commerce in the considered period. The lower exit rates reported in our sample are
likely due to the large-firm bias of the dataset, since larger firms on average tend to benefit from
softer budget constraints and display higher survival rates than small firms. The distribution
over time and across industries of MNEs is reported in Table 25.
In terms of validation, we have retrieved from our sample a yearly measure of regional output,
summing the individual firms’ revenues operating in each region. We have then correlated these
figures so obtained with the official regional figures for Romania, obtaining a significant positive
correlation of 0.836. As a result our firm-level data seem to belong to an unbiased sample, being
able to reproduce the actual evolution of output in Romania.
[Table 1 and 2 about here]
3 Methodology
To calculate domestic firm-specific productivity estimates, we have first deflated our balance
sheet data using a total of 48 NACE2 or NACE3 industry-specific price indices retrieved from
the Eurostat New Cronos database, according to the classification reported in the Statistical
Annex 7. We have proxied output with deflated sales, given the better quality of these time
series with respect to the ones reporting value added. The number of employees has been used
as a proxy for the labour input, and the deflated value of tangible fixed assets as a proxy
for capital. We have then reaggregated our initial classification of industries at the NACE2
level8, estimating within each industry semi-parametric productivity measures at the firm level.
5Information on the FDI stock up to 1994 has been retrieved from the PECODB dataset, a firm-specific
collection of 4,200 FDI operations undertaken in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the period
1990-2002, also based on AMADEUS data and developed by ISLA-Bocconi University. In terms of validation, the
database is able to account for almost 70 per cent of the region’s total FDI inward stock in the early years of
transition, as registered by official statistics.
6Since our sample does not include all NACE industries (in particular agriculture), we have subtracted from
official regional GVA data the output of those industries not present in our dataset. The correlation between our
sample and the official regional data comprising all NACE industries is instead 0.73.
7The classification allows to divide industries into economies of scale, traditional, high tech and specialised
industries, plus services, according to Pavitt (1984). The same classification has been used by Davies and Lyons
(1996) to divide industries into high, medium and low sunk costs. As such, the classification allows us to consider
market structures, and hence prices, as relatively homogeneous within each industry.
8Firm-specific TFP estimates have been calculated for the 1995-2001 period within each NACE2 industry, in
order to ensure an adequate number of observations for each productivity estimate. In a few cases (i.e. NACE16,
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In fact, using ordinary least squares when estimating productivity implies treating labor and
other inputs as exogenous variables. However, as pointed out by Griliches and Mareisse (1995),
profit-maximizing firms immediately adjust their inputs (in particular capital) each time they
observe a productivity shock, which makes input levels correlated with the same shocks. Since
productivity shocks are unobserved to the econometrician, they enter in the error term of the
regression. Hence, inputs turn out to be correlated with the error term of the regression, and thus
OLS estimates of production functions are biased. Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) have developed two similar semi-parametric estimation procedures to overcome
this problem.
The use of the latter procedure (see Annex 1 for further details) has allowed us to solve
the simultaneity bias affecting standard estimates of firm-level productivity, as well as to derive
TFP estimates from heterogeneous, industry-specific production functions. In order to check
the appropriateness of our correction for simultaneity, Table 3 reports, for a sample of NACE2
industries, the clear bias that emerges when confronting the results of the semi-parametric
estimates of domestic firms’ productivity with standard OLS results.
[Table 3 about here]
Since our aim is to measure the impact of the MNEs’ presence on the average domestic firm,
we have opted for a balanced panel design, aggregating firm-specific TFP measures across the 48
industries and 8 regions over the years 1995-2001, thus using as a dependent variable the average
TFP of industry i and region j at time t calculated over individual firms. More importantly, the
latter treatment of the dependent variable allows us to minimize potential biases in our TFP
measure deriving from the heterogeneity in the mark-ups faced by individual firms9.
In terms of model design, we have related our dependent variable to the presence of MNEs
in the industry-region pair. A common measure of the latter variable, widely used in the
literature, is the share of MNE’s employment over total employment within the considered
industry/region in each year, or its change over time. However, measures of this kind imply
that an equiproportional increase in MNEs’ presence and total employment (thus yielding a
constant share) will have no effect on domestic firms’ productivity. If the absolute values of
20 and 65) industries have displayed insufficient variation to identify the input coefficients. Accordingly, TFP
measures from firms belonging to these industries have not been considered in the follow-up of our exercise.
9Since the seminal paper of Klette and Griliches (1996), it is known that proxying physical inputs and outputs
through nominal variables deflated by a broad price index might lead to biased productivity measures, due to an
omitted price variable bias induced by the correlation between firms’ prices and their used inputs. Katayama,
Lu and Tybout (2003) argue that taking industry and region-specific averages on firm-specific measures allows
to partially counter this criticism, since the cross-producer variation in productivity measures is much more
problematic than the temporal variation of the population of plants.
7
the elasticities of foreign and total employment are different, Castellani and Zanfei (2003) have
shown that using only the ratio of foreign to total employment downwardly biases the estimate
of the coefficient.
As a result, we have opted for a model design where the presence of MNEs is identified by
the number of the same multinationals operating in a given industry/region in a given year. In
particular, since we want to capture the marginal effects on domestic firms’TFP of a change in
the presence of MNEs, we shall estimate the following regression equation:
∆ ln(TPFijt) = αDijt−1 + βDijt−1CumFDIijt−1 + γi + γj + γt + εijt (1)
where Dijt−1 is a dummy variable related to the change in the number of MNEs, taking value
1 if an investment is undertaken in sector i of region j in year t− 1, and CumFDIijt−1 is
the cumulated number (in logs) of foreign investments in sector i of region j at time t − 1.
The coefficient α thus captures the average effect of a change in the MNEs’ presence, while the
coefficient β, which refers to the interaction of the investment dummyDijt−1 with the cumulated
number of FDI, captures the marginal effects on domestic firms’ TFP.
In our specification we have to take care of a number of econometric concerns. First of
all, we control for endogeneity and unobserved time, region and industry-specific characteristics
that might affect the correlation between firm productivity and foreign presence by first differ-
encing the (log of) the dependent variable, i.e. using ∆ ln(TPFijt), by lagging one period the
MNEs-related variables and by including industry, region and time fixed effects γi, γj and γt,
respectively.
Another econometric concern is related to the nature of CumFDI, a count variable which
in principle treats as equal FDI in different industries, i.e. MNEs which are likely to be char-
acterized by different firms’ sizes. If there is a systematic difference over time in the size of
MNEs which enter in each industry, ignoring it might lead to potential spurious correlations,
not entirely captured by our fixed-effects. However, having calculated the median size of the
MNEs that have entered in each industry in each year, we can rule out specific trends over time
in this variable, and thus we can exclude that our results are driven by particular dynamics of
specific industries. Finally, the cumulated number of foreign investments is a variable increasing
over time, and hence non-stationary. Although the variable enters in our specification always
interacted with the investment dummy and time-effects are included in our regression, we could
still get a positive spurious relation between TFP and foreign presence, as well as problems
with the asymptotic properties of our estimators, if there is serial correlation in the error terms.
Though the econometric literature in general acknowledges (e.g. Baltagi, 2001) that the prob-
lem is negligible in micro panels such as ours, characterized by a large number of cross-sectional
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units (48*8 in our case) with respect to time (6 years), we report the modified version of the
Durbin-Watson statistic for balanced panels, as proposed by Bhargava et al. (1982), in order to
assess the extent of the problem for each model specification.
A positive horizontal spillover from MNEs entry on domestic productivity is obtained, in
principle, when α+ βCumFDIijt−1 > 0. More specifically, we can check if spillovers are on av-
erage positive (negative), i.e. a positive (negative) and significant α, but decreasing (increasing)
as more MNEs enter, i.e. a negative (positive) and significant β, the parameter controlling for
the marginal effects10. The ratio αˆβˆ derived from our model design is then a useful statistic to
test the relevance of marginal spillovers.
In particular, the critical value of the number of foreign investors that determines the sign
of the aggregate spillover can be calculated setting α + βCumFDIijt−1 = 0. E.g., if α > 0,
β < 0 and −αβ is significantly different from 0, there exists a threshold value CumFDI∗ = −
α
β
of FDI below which aggregate spillovers are positive. Spillovers then become negative as soon
as MNEs’ entry proceeds.
As a refinement of the previous specification, we specify an industry-specific threshold
CumFDI∗i . In fact, in the already quoted paper by Aitken and Harrison (1999), it is claimed
that one should distinguish between large and small domestic firms, since it is more likely that
industries characterized by larger firms will possess a sufficient level of absorptive capacity to
benefit from the presence of FDI. We have thus refined our model specification so that the
threshold depends on MESi, the minimum efficient scale11 of industry i, as follows:
∆ ln(TPFijt) = αDijt−1 + βDijt−1
CumFDIijt−1
MESi
+ γi + γj + γt + εijt (2)
The intuition explored in model (2) is that industries characterized by larger firms (i.e. a
higher MES) should exhibit a higher critical threshold level of FDI after which their spillover
becomes negative. Interacting CumFDI and MES as reported yields in fact a critical value of
the (industry-specific) threshold CumFDI∗i = −αβMESi, in line with the original intuition of
Aitken and Harrison (1999)12.
Moreover, to include an intercept in the latter linear relationship for the threshold, we can
further generalize the model design as






+ γi + γj + γt + εijt (3)
10Note that when assessing the overall impact of spillover as α + βCumFDIijt−1, the coefficient α can be
interpreted as the effect of the first investment on domestic firms’ TFP changes.
11The minimum efficient scale has been calculated as the median employment of the firms in each industry.
12Interacting CumFDI and MES in the proposed way essentially implies to assign greater weight to those
FDI undertaken in industries characterised by lower barriers of entry (lower MES). We can therefore control for
the industries in which the competition effect from MNEs should be a priori stronger.
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so that the threshold becomes CumFDI∗i = −αβMESi −
γ
β . In this case, we can then explicitly
design a test statistic for both the coefficient of our functional form, αβ , and its intercept
γ
β .
The next section discusses the results of the three model specifications in the case of Romania.
4 Empirical Results
Our results are presented in Table 4. In the first column we test for our Model 1, thus only
considering the (log of) cumulated FDI. As it can be seen, the analysis reveals that FDI under-
taken at time t− 1 has a positive and significant impact on the average productivity changes in
a given industry/region, providing evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. More specifically,
the estimate for α reveals that, on average, the first foreign investment in a specific sector and
region increases domestic TFP by almost 3.5%. The effect however decreases as the number of
multinational increases (negative sign of the interaction between Dijt−1 and CumFDI). The
critical value, −αβ , is positive and significantly different from 0 at the 5% level of significance. In
particular, the threshold indicates that negative spillovers arise on average from the 12th invest-
ment on. The modified Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to 2 across all model specifications,
indicating no problems of serial correlation in the error terms.
Nevertheless, in the previous model specification the estimate for β is not significantly differ-
ent from 0, probably due to the industry-specific nature of β. In fact, interacting the cumulated
number of FDI with the inverse of minimum efficient scale, calculated as the firms’ median
employment in each industry, highly reduces the industry heterogeneity and yields significant
results, thus confirming our hypothesis (Model 2) of the existence of an industry-specific thresh-
old CumFDI∗i = −αβMESi. Column 2 of the Table shows that α is still positive and significant,
while β is now also significantly different from 0. Moreover, our test statistic −αβ is positive and
significant.
In order to check whether in our expression for the industry-specific threshold we have
omitted an intercept term, we have also included in the regression the term γDijt−1 1MESi , which
implies a threshold CumFDI∗i = −αβMESi −
γ
β (Model 3). To avoid multicollinearity, we have
instrumented 1MESi , the (inverse of) the industry-specific MES, with
1
MESij , i.e. the (inverse
of) MES calculated for each industry i and region j. The results are reported in Column 3.
Again, both α and β are significant, as it is our test statistic −αβ > 0, while we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the intercept, −γβ , equals zero at conventional levels of significance.
Following the related literature (e.g. Sinani and Meyer, 2004 or Glass and Saggi, 2002),
as a robustness check we have augmented Model 3 with the Herfindahl index calculated for
both domestic and foreign firms (Column 4a) or for domestic firms only (Column 4b), with the
stock of FDI cumulated at the beginning of our observation period and with the investment in
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intangible assets in a given industry/region as a proxy for firms’ absorptive capacity (Column
5)13. Our estimates of α and β are very robust to these different model specifications, as well
as our hypothesis of a zero intercept term in our threshold expression.
As a further robustness check, we have recalculated our estimates removing the assumption,
implicit in our model specification, that the impact of the MNEs’ presence affects domestic
firms’ productivity only in the year in which the investment by the MNE has been undertaken
(CumFDI is multiplied by a flow dummy D which has no ‘memory’ of past investments).
Hence, we have introduced a dummy D0 that takes value 1 if an investment has dropped in the
considered industry/region in any year before t, and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 5, the
results are virtually unchanged, yielding, if anything, a slightly poorer model specification.
[Table 4 and 5 about here]
Based on the estimates of α and β reported in Column 2 of Table 4, we have calculated
in Table 6 the industry-specific thresholds of FDI for which the competition effects induced
by multinational firms are on aggregate lower than the positive spillovers they generate on
the local economy. Technically, given our model design, one should compare the thresholds so
obtained with the industry and region-specific cumulated number of FDI, in order to assess the
sign of the horizontal spillovers to the local economy. As it can be seen in Table 6, while for
some industries more than one FDI in a given industry/region seems to be enough to generate
a negative spillover, for other industries the marginal negative effect induced by the entry of
further MNEs is still lower than the benefits the latter generate on the local economy.
[Table 6 about here]
5 Conclusion and further lines of research
Our analysis confirms that, in the case of Romania, there exists a (industry-specific) threshold
of MNEs driving the results of aggregate spillovers. We can thus conclude that the concept of
‘marginal’ spillovers becomes relevant, i.e. the combined effects of positive horizontal spillover
and competition on domestic firms’ TFP are not constant, but rather varying with the progres-
sive entry of new MNEs, with initially positive effects progressively overcome by the increase in
the competition from multinationals. As a result, if horizontal spillovers measures are combined
in a unique coefficient, measuring the average impact over time of the MNEs’ presence on the
13In their study of MNEs’ spillovers on domestic firms in transition economies, Damijan et al. (2003) find
significantly different results when controlling for domestic firms’ absorptive capacity as proxied here. However,
they employ a different measure of productivity, i.e. output per employee rather than TFP.
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productivity of Romanian domestic firms, as the current literature has been doing, it is very
likely that the same coefficient is not significant and biased, essentially due to a misspecification
in the model which fails to take into account the changes in the market structure induced by
the continuous entry of MNEs.
In the case of Romania, the threshold probably reflects the fact that firms in transition
countries slowly adapt to more modern production techniques and that high exit barriers prevent
the shake out of domestic firms. Clearly, although our findings can explain the puzzling evidence
of no significant horizontal spillovers on average, they cannot clarify the nature of the previously
quoted empirical evidence of positive spillovers for developed countries (e.g. Haskel, Pereira
and Slaughter, 2002). As the number of investors in advanced countries is much higher than
in developing countries, one possibility is that there may exist another threshold number of
investors above which spillovers become positive. Every study of this kind, therefore, should
run a preliminary check on the relevance of marginal spillovers before drawing conclusions on
horizontal spillovers.
In terms of policy implications, this study suggests that FDI attraction policies should focus
on sectors where the marginal effect of foreign entry is positive, as illustrated in our Table 6 for
Romania. In sectors where the number of cumulated FDI is still below the calculated threshold,
in fact, the spillover effect is likely to outweigh the competition effect and benefits for the
productivity of local firms might be expected. In industries characterized by lower critical FDI
thresholds, instead, any new FDI entering the market aggravates negative spillovers to domestic
firms.
More in general, however, it still remains to be assessed the precise cause of the decline in
the impact of foreign entry on domestic TFP. In other words, while we have realized that, after
a given threshold in the FDI presence, the negative competition outweighs the spillover effect,
we still do not know the reasons behind the emergence of this threshold.
Especially the competition effect should be the subject of a more thorough investigation.
In the Introduction, we have offered a tentative explanation: foreign entry might crowd out
domestic firms and hence, given a slow adjustment in inputs due to adjustment costs, reduce
their TFP. Alternatively, a lower TFP might be induced by the lower economies of scale accruing
to domestic firms given their smaller market sizes, progressively compressed by the presence of
the foreign competitors. But the latter explanation will be true only for sectors characterized by
increasing returns, a restriction that we have clearly not imposed in our calculation of production
functions and TFP. Also strategic decisions of technology transfers by MNEs entering domestic
markets should be more carefully studied in order to better understand a possible decline in
positive spillovers through the changing nature of technology transfers, endogenous to the market
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structure14. Clearly, a thorough examination of all these possible channels is left to a future
research agenda.
14For example, in Blalock and Gertler (2004) MNEs have an incentive to widely diffuse technology to their
suppliers in order to avoid an hold-up problem. However, since the MNE cannot prevent the upstream suppliers
from selling also to the multinational’s competitors in the downstream market, if the foreign firm faces too much
competition, it will start to strategically reduce its degree of technology transfers. Also Belderbos et al. (2005)
find that the decision to invest in R&D in a foreign country by a MNE affects negatively the location decision of
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Annex 1: Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) productivity estimates
Let yt denote (the log of) a firm’s output in a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
yt = β0 + βllt + βkkt + βmmt + ωt + ηt (A1.1)
where lt and mt denote the (freely available) labour and intermediates inputs in logs, respectively, and kt is the
logarithm of the state variable capital. The error term has two components: ηt, which is uncorrelated with input
choices, and ωt, a productivity shock unobserved to the econometrician, but observed by the firm. Since the firm
adapts its input choice as soon as she observes ωt, inputs turn out to be correlated with the error term of the
regression, and thus OLS estimates of production functions yield inconsistent results.
To correct for this problem, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), from now on LP, assume the demand for interme-
diate inputs mt (e.g. material costs) to depend on the firm’s capital kt and productivity ωt, and show that the
same demand is monotonically increasing in ωt. Thus, it is possible for them to write ωt as ωt = ωt(kt,mt),
expressing the unobserved productivity shock ωt as a function of two observables, kt and mt.
To allow for identification of ωt, LP follow Olley and Pakes (1996) and assume ωt to follow a Markov process
of the form ωt = E[ωt|ωt−1] + ξt, where ξt is a change in productivity uncorrelated with kt. Through these
assumptions it is then possible to rewrite Equation (A1.1) as
yt = βllt + φt(kt,mt) + ηt (A1.2)
where φt(kt,mt) = β0+βkkt+βmmt+ωt(kt,mt). By substituting a third-order polynomial approximation
in kt andmt in place of φt(kt,mt), LP show that it is possible to consistently estimate the parameter bβl and bφt
in Equation A1.2. For any candidate value β∗k and β∗m one can then compute a prediction for ωt for all periods
t, since bωt = bφt− β∗kkt−β∗mmt and hence, using these predicted values, estimate E[ dωt|ωt−1]. It then follows
that the residual generated by β∗k and β∗m with respect to yt can be written as
dηt + ξt = yt − bβllt − β∗kkt − β∗mmt −E[ dωt|ωt−1] (A1.3)
Equation (A1.3) can then be used to identify β∗k and β∗m using the following two instruments: if the capital
stock kt is determined by the previous period’s investment decisions, it then does not respond to shocks to
productivity at time t, and hence E[ηt + ξt|kt] = 0; also, if the last period’s level of intermediate inputs
mt is uncorrelated with the error period at time t (which is plausible, e.g. in the case of material costs), then
E[ηt + ξt|mt−1] = 0.
Through these two moment conditions, it is then possible to write a consistent and unbiased estimator for








( dηt + ξt)Zht]2 (A1.4)
with Zt ≡ (kt,mt−1) and h indexing the elements of Zt.
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Table 1. The evolution of the panel of Romanian firms. Sample vs. official data 
Year Number of firms Entry Rate Exit Rate 
 Dom MNEs Total 
MNEs 
penetration Sample Official Sample Official 
1995 4764 1217 5981 0.20     
1996 5449 1504 6953 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.09 
1997 5898 1653 7551 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.07 
1998 6389 1896 8285 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.07 
1999 6957 2121 9078 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.06 
2000 7331 2603 9934 0.26 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.09 
2001 7605 3045 10650 0.29 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.10 




Table 2. Cumulative FDI in Romania, 1990-2001. 
NACE Stock 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
10,14 2 13 24 31 36 42 48 49 
151,152 0 6 11 19 21 24 27 29 
153,155 0 10 17 26 30 39 44 49 
156 0 4 12 19 20 21 21 30 
157 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 4 
158 0 27 42 61 87 94 106 112 
159 6 10 21 24 32 35 39 40 
16 0 0 1 2 5 6 7 7 
17 1 9 28 54 77 97 109 124 
18 4 17 49 80 122 153 180 204 
19 0 9 22 39 57 66 83 97 
20 1 17 43 80 113 142 172 192 
21 0 3 11 14 22 27 33 34 
22 0 14 27 39 52 64 70 71 
241,242 2 5 13 15 22 27 28 29 
243,245 2 6 10 16 22 26 31 35 
246,247 1 1 2 2 5 7 7 8 
251 0 3 4 6 7 8 8 9 
252,262 0 6 16 32 45 53 68 77 
26 1 7 14 21 29 34 41 46 
27 3 4 7 10 21 26 30 33 
28 1 8 18 43 55 70 85 101 
291 0 1 2 4 5 7 9 10 
292 0 1 2 5 8 10 11 12 
293 0 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 
294,295 2 4 9 13 15 17 21 27 
297 0 0 2 3 3 3 4 4 
30 0 3 6 12 14 15 18 21 
31 2 6 10 14 21 29 33 47 
321 0 0 1 3 5 5 7 10 
322,323 1 3 3 5 7 8 11 12 
331,332 0 1 2 4 4 6 6 9 
334,335 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 
341 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
343 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
351 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
352,354 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
361,362 1 5 16 31 43 48 59 74 
363,365 1 2 2 3 7 9 9 10 
366 0 1 3 10 15 18 25 30 
40 0 0 3 5 7 7 8 10 
45 2 19 47 91 144 171 202 224 
55 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
642 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 
65,66 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
92 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: authors’ elaboration on the basis of the AMADEUS dataset. See Annex for details on the classification 
of industries. 
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Table 3. A comparison of productivity estimates in a sample of NACE2 industries 
 
 
NACE2 Industry Food Automotive Wood products 
Rubber and 
Plastics 
Lev Pet (2003) ln (labor) 0.0257 *** 0.0552*** 0.0578*** 0.0603*** 
 ln (materials) 0.8436 *** 0.9756*** 0.8547*** 0.7672*** 
 ln (capital) 0.0858 *** 0.1617*** 0.0803*** 0.1021*** 
OLS ln (labor) 0.1494 *** 0.2184*** 0.2653*** 0.2823*** 
 ln (materials) 0.9199 *** 0.9224*** 0.8992*** 0.8927*** 
 ln (capital) 0.0019 -0.0238 0.0017 -0.0261*** 
 OLS bias in labor coeff. + + + +
 OLS bias in material coeff. + - - +
 OLS bias in capital coeff. not sign. not sign.
 
not sign. -









Lev Pet (2003) ln (labor) 0.111 *** 0.1270*** 0.1995*** 0.2124*** 
 ln (materials) 0.8939 *** 0.7120*** 0.7010*** 0.8772*** 
 ln (capital) 0.0831 ** 0.1382*** 0.0659 0.0049 
OLS ln (labor) 0.3098 *** 0.3601*** 0.3898*** 0.5697*** 
 ln (materials) 0.8774 *** 0.8201*** 0.7575*** 0.7101*** 
 ln (capital) -0.0392 *** -0.0097** 0.0468*** 0.0468*** 
 OLS bias in labor coeff. + + + +
 OLS bias in material coeff. - + + -
 OLS bias in capital coeff. - - not sign. not sign.
 N. of domestic firms 2821 8697 812 721
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Table 4. Marginal spillover effects from FDI – Flow dummy 
 
Dep var.: average change in ln(TFP) (Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) 


































Herfindal (all firms) 





Herfindal (dom. firms) 
    
.008 
(.03)  
FDI Stock 1994 




     
.01 
(.01) 
48 Industry dummies 83.08*** 79.85*** 80.25*** 79.92*** 80.46*** 77.55*** 
8 Regional dummies 4.63 4.50 4.58 4.57 4.55 4.99 
6 Time dummies 46.64*** 48.88*** 44.67*** 43.01*** 44.37*** 43.01*** 
R-sq.  
.26 .27 .27 .27 .27 .28 
N. of obs. 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 
Modified Durbin-Watson 













Spillover test statistic a 
Χ 2 4.38** 5.80** 5.23** 5.21** 5.28** 5.15** 
Intercept test statistic b 
Χ 2 - - 1.62 1.61 1.63 1.60 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Joint significance tests for industry, region and time dummies. 
*, ** or ***: significant at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level respectively. 
(a) Ho: α/β=0 given α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1 (Column 1) and α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES (Columns 2-5) 
(b) Ho: γ/β=0 given α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES + γ Dt-1/MES  
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Table 5. Marginal spillover effects from FDI – First investment dummy 
 
Dep var.: average change in ln(TFP) (Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) 


































Herfindal (all firms) 





Herfindal (dom. firms) 
    
.006 
(.03)  
FDI Stock 1994 




     
.01 
(.01) 
48 Sector dummies 85.59*** 82.93*** 83.55*** 82.97*** 83.67*** 80.44*** 
8 Regional dummies 4.91 4.89 5.00 4.98 4.99 5.41 
6 Time dummies 43.55*** 47.61*** 44.41*** 42.83*** 44.17*** 43.05*** 
R-sq.  
.27 .27 .27 .27 .27 .28 
N. of obs. 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 
Modified Durbin-Watson 













Spillover test a 
Χ 2 2.50 2.82* 3.53* 3.52* 3.52* 3.69* 
Intercept test statistic b 
Χ 2 - - 1.75 1.74 1.75 1.78 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Joint significance tests for sector, region and time dummies. 
*, ** or ***: significant at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level respectively. 
(a) Ho: α/β=0 given α D’t-1 + β D’t-1*Cumfdit-1 (Column 1) and α D’t-1 + β D’t-1*Cumfdit-1/MES (Columns 2-5) 
(b) Ho: γ/β=0 given α D’t-1 + β D’t-1*Cumfdit-1/MES + γ D’t-1/MES  
 22 
Table 6. Industry-specific FDI thresholds for positive spillovers 
 
Nace CumFDI*  Nace CumFDI* 
10,14 1  292 3 
151,152 2  293 3 
153,155 2  294,295 4 
156 2  297 2 
157 7  30 3 
158 2  31 24 
159 2  321 11 
16 2  322,323 69 
17 2  331,332 81 
18 2  334,335 18 
19 3  341 1 
20 2  343 2 
21 2  351 72 
22 1  352,354 30 
241,242 3  361,362 2 
243,245 43  363,365 3 
246,247 16  366 3 
251 14  40 3 
252,262 2  45 1 
26 3  55 1 
27 11  642 3 
28 2  65,66 13 
291 2  92 3 
Note: CumFDI* = -α∗ΜΕS/β - γ/β as retrieved from Column 2, Table 4.  
See the Statistical Annex for the definition of the NACE codes. 
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Statistical Annex – Classification of industries 
The model includes a total of 48 NACE 2 and 3 digits industries, grouped as follows: 
Economies of scale industries: 10-11-12-13 and 14 (mining of coal, metals and stone; extraction of petroleum 
and natural gas); 21 (paper and pulp); 22 (publishing and press); 241 and 242 (basic chemicals and agro-
chemicals); 246 and 247 (other chemical products and synthetic fibres); 251 (rubber products); 26 (other non-
metallic products); 27 (metallurgy); 297 (domestic appliances); 31 (electrical appliances, excluding domestic); 
321 (electronics); 322 and 323 (communication equipment); 341 (car production); 343 (car components); 351 
(ship building); 352 and 354 (railways; motorcycles); 40 (energy) 
Traditional industries: 151 and 152 (production and transformation of meat and fish); 153 and 155 (vegetables, 
milk and dairy products); 156 (grains); 157 (pet food); 158 (fabrication of bread, tea, coffee); 159 (drink and 
beverages); 16 (tobacco); 17 (textiles); 18 (clothing); 19 (leather); 20 (wood); 28 (metals); 361 and 362 
(furniture); 363 and 365 (musical instruments and toys); 366 (other general manufacturing) 
Specialized industries; 252 and 262 (plastic products); 291 (mechanical machinery); 292 (general machinery); 
293 (agricultural machines); 294 and 295 (machine tools); 334 and 335 (optics, photography, clocks); 45 
(construction) 
High-tech industries: 243-245 (paintings and pharmaceuticals); 244 (pharmaceuticals); 30 (office machines and 
computers); 331 and 332 (medical and precision instruments); 642 (telecommunication) 
Services: 55 (hotels and restaurants); 65 and 66 (financial intermediation and insurance); 72 (computer and 
related activities); 73 (research and development); 92 (cultural and sporting activities) 
